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Internationalization and innovation performance of emerging market enterprises: 
The role of host-country institutional development 
 
Abstract 
We examine how host-country institutional development influences innovation performance of 
internationalized emerging market enterprises (EMEs). Our panel-data analysis of Chinese EMEs shows 
that although host-country institutional development on average enhances innovation performance of the 
parent, such effects are more pronounced for EMEs with strong absorptive capacity and for those 
diversifying into a larger number of countries. Interestingly, EMEs with a higher level of state ownership 
gain more when entering countries with a lower level of institutional development. Our findings offer 
insights regarding how latecomer EMEs should configure their portfolio of subsidiaries in order to 
enhance innovation performance of their parent.   
 
Keywords: Internationalization, Innovation performance, Institutional environment, Absorptive capacity, 
State ownership, Geographic diversification  
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1. Introduction  
Emerging market enterprises (EMEs) are increasingly venturing into foreign countries (Buckley et al., 
2007; Wang et al., 2012a; Wang et al., 2012b). Unlike firms from developed countries, EMEs operate in 
environments characterised by under-developed institutions that constrain the development of internal 
capabilities for innovation (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Luo & Tung, 2007). Extant research suggests that 
firms originating from weak institutional settings expand overseas to seek more efficient institutions 
(Luo, Xue & Han, 2010; Yamakawa, Peng & Deeds., 2008) that may enable them to enhance their 
innovation performance and global competitiveness. Evolutionary theories of the multinational enterprise 
(MNE) suggest that knowledge and assets accessed and assimilated from foreign locations enrich the 
firm’s knowledge bases which can lead to enhanced innovation performance (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; 
Kogut & Zander, 1993). Nevertheless, these studies have focused on the gains accrued at the subsidiary 
level and, therefore, as a result, we know very little about whether and how host-country institutional 
development affects the innovation performance of the parent of the internationalizing EME. This 
research gap is important because even though the patents for the parent company may come from 
innovations generated both at home and through knowledge acquisition from foreign subsidiaries, the role 
of the latter is often assumed away. From a strategic management point of view, accounting for the role of 
host-country institutional development may enable a more nuanced interpretation about where and how 
EMEs derive capabilities enabling them to innovate despite their weak internal R&D capabilities and 
unfavorable home-country institutional environment. Building on theories of institution and innovation, 
we examine how the level of host-country institutional development (via EME’s portfolio of subsidiaries) 
influences innovation at home in addition to any unique home-based innovations and further examine 
how firm-specific idiosyncrasies (i.e. level of state ownership and absorptive capacity) and 
internationalization strategies (i.e. the geographic diversity of foreign locations and joint ventures vs 
wholly owned subsidiaries entry mode) affect this relationship. We propose that these contingencies may 
be particularly valuable in explaining which EMEs benefit from operating within well-developed foreign 
institutions. Our study, therefore, contributes to theories on internationalization and innovation in several 
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ways.  
First, prior research suggests that well-developed host-country institutions can help EMEs nurture 
innovation by providing factor inputs and innovation intermediaries and by reducing transaction costs 
(e.g., Wang, Yi, Kafouros & Yan, 2015). On the other hand, many EMEs are not used to operate in such 
environments, and therefore, may be less able to exploit the associated benefits and may have to 
implement costly and disruptive organizational changes. So theory does not clearly predict when and how 
the level of institutional development in the host countries influences the innovation outcomes of the 
internationalizing EME. We, therefore, argue that not all internationalized EMEs benefit equally from 
well-developed institutions in the host country but instead this depends on the level of state ownership 
and more importantly on whether EMEs’ ownership type matches the level of host-country institutional 
development. 
Second, previous studies show that host-country institutions can be a source of competitive advantage 
for international ventures (Kim & Hoskisson, 2010), enabling firms to outperform competitors that 
remain at home. However, we argue that as firms differ in their abilities to internalize and benefit from 
host-country institutional advantages, only EMEs that possess stronger absorptive capacity can reap such 
institutional benefits and enhance their innovation performance. Our study thus differs from prior studies 
that examine whether absorptive capacity enables firms to benefit from external knowledge by testing the 
effects of absorptive capacity in assimilating the advantages host-countries’ institutions offer to the 
innovation performance of internationalized EMEs. 
Third, extant research provides mix findings about whether internationalised firms can benefit from 
geographical diversification of their subsidiaries (Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 1997). We explain that a 
greater geographic reach allow firms to get access to a larger set of different types of 
innovation-supporting institutions, and empirically demonstrate that the effects of institutional 
development of the host country on innovation performance are stronger for EMEs who choose a broad 
instead of a narrow set of countries when they venture abroad. We thus extend prior theorizing by 
proposing that the differential effects of internationalization on innovation performance can be explained 
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not only by the host-country level of institutional development , but also by differences in the geographic 
diversity of a firm’s overseas subsidiaries.  
Fourth, prior studies suggest that entry modes influence how foreign firms learn from foreign 
markets, innovate and transfer technology back home (e.g., Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev & Peng, 2013; 
Yamakawa et al. 2008). However, research rarely examines how entry mode choices shape the effects of 
host-countries’ institutions on the innovation performance of the internationalizing firm. Our study fills 
this gap by proposing that having a portfolio of joint venture (JV) alliances or wholly owned subsidiaries 
(WOS) influences differently this effect. This conceptualization advances the premise that the ability to 
exploit host-country institutional advantages depends on internationalization entry decisions, thus 
bringing the literatures on institutions, entry mode choice and innovation under a more comprehensive 
framework.   
China is a particularly suitable context for this study not only because many Chinese firms have 
improved their position in the global battle for technological leadership but also because the country has 
catapulted in the world’s third place of outward FDI with an estimated US$101billion in 2013 (WIR, 
2014) expanding into countries with heterogeneous institutional environments (Cui & Jiang, 2009). To 
test our hypotheses, we explore the internationalization of 599 Chinese manufacturing firms (with 
established portfolios of foreign subsidiaries in diverse geographical locations) through a longitudinal study 
of 4,067 firm-year observations for the period 2000-2010. Our findings demonstrate how host-country 
institutions positively influence the innovation performance of the parent and how firm-specific 
idiosyncrasies and internationalization strategies influence this relationship. The findings of the study also 
have implications for how managers of internationalizing EMEs can exploit institutional advantages of the 
host country and enhance innovation performance. 
 
2.  Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Innovation depends on the company’s capability to learn and integrate diverse knowledge and resources 
from multiple countries (Hitt et al., 1997; Yamakawa et al., 2008). International expansion, then, serves as a 
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‘springboard’ for developing organizational learning and acquiring innovative capabilities (Luo & Tung, 
2007). Institutions on the other hand, commonly defined as “the rules of game” (North, 1990), influence 
firms’ innovation structures and processes as well as the availability and cost of innovation inputs (Jackson 
& Deeg, 2008). A well-functioning and well-developed institutional environment may stimulate 
innovation by providing what firms cannot produce individually and by allowing firms to get access to 
various factors and innovation intermediaries, and build innovation-enhancing relationships (e.g., 
inter-firm alliances and research collaborations). Although globalization has accelerated in the past three 
decades, national innovation and institution systems differ in terms of, for example, government policies, 
regulations, education and research in universities, among others. These differences affect the quality and 
quantity of inputs and the demand for outputs of innovation and, therefore, the availability of technologies, 
know-how and intangible assets in a given location. Hence, because international differences in 
institutional development still persist (Hoskisson et al., 2013), the innovation-enhancing effects of 
internationalization may vary depending on the locations in which the firm’s portfolio of subsidiaries 
operates.  
In this study we expect that a host country’s level of institutional development to affect the parent 
EME’s innovation performance through its effects on the portfolio of the firm’s subsidiaries. The following 
section, therefore, explains how subsidiaries enhance their learning and knowhow while operating abroad 
and how they transfer this back to the parent in order to develop innovations.  
 
2.1 Knowledge flows from subsidiaries to the parent  
 MNEs from emerging markets tend to locate their subsidiaries in countries where institutional setups 
allow for increased opportunity for learning and technological knowledge-sourcing (Dunning, 1998; 
Kotabe, Dunlap-Hinkler, Parente & Mishra, 2007). Each of these subsidiaries may help them access a 
unique set of advantages and resources tied to particular countries (Hitt et al., 1997; Kafouros, Buckley & 
Clegg, 2012) and increase the likelihood of developing novel technological combinations (Jacobides, 
Knudsen & Augier, 2006). Furthermore, in well-developed host-country institutional environments, 
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foreign subsidiaries can access, recruit and/or collaborate with high-qualified and experienced local talent 
(i.e. scientists, designers and engineers) which can enhance the firm’s innovation performance (Florida, 
1997; Tung, 2007). In addition, because countries with well-endowed institutional settings are also 
characterized by dynamic and competitive local business environments they compel foreign subsidiaries to 
continuously upgrade their capabilities and keep up with the competition to ensure future survival and 
growth (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Wan, 2005). 
By internalizing local technological and institutional strengths of the area in which they are located, 
subsidiaries can develop their innovative capabilities and, thus, become contributors of valuable knowledge 
outflows to the parent, as well as to other subsidiaries within the internationalized firm’s network 
(Michailova & Mustaffa, 2012). This ‘reverse’ technology transfer generates opportunities for the parent by 
finding useful applications of the geographically dispersed knowledge and capabilities their subsidiaries 
accumulate and create (Teece, 2014). The rationale is that subsidiaries act as ‘listening posts’ that capture 
the advanced knowledge from abroad and then augment home-based innovation by transferring it back to 
the parent (Hedge & Hicks, 2008). Indeed recent studies on patent and citations suggest that there is an 
increase in the flow of knowledge from the subsidiaries to the parent (Singh, 2004). Empirical studies also 
demonstrate how portfolios of firms’ subsidiaries tap into global reservoirs of knowledge and intangible 
resources and enhance the entire MNEs’ knowledge bases, capabilities and competitiveness (Kafouros et al, 
2012; Lu & Beamish, 2004). For example, when Samsung needed to catch up and improve its technology in 
memory chips it located R&D subsidiaries in the Silicon Valley in the USA. Once the subsidiaries gained 
understanding and assimilated the advanced know-how they were able to transfer this capability back to the 
parent in Korea (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005). Similarly, Chinese Haier relied on 
establishing home-base augmenting R&D subsidiaries in countries such as the USA, Germany and Japan to 
acquire foreign technology, exploit localized knowledge spillovers and develop its own innovative products 
aimed at both Chinese home and global customers (Liu & Li, 2002). 
Building on the above, in the following paragraphs we demonstrate how well-developed 
host-country institutions positively influence the innovation performance of the parent of the 
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internationalized firm. We, further, develop four hypotheses that examine how firm-specific idiosyncrasies 
and internationalization strategies influence the foreign institutions – parent firm innovation performance 
relationship.  
 
2.2. Host country institutional development and EMEs’ innovation performance 
Because well-developed institutions reduce uncertainty and lower transaction and search costs (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; North, 1990), we argue that expansion into foreign countries with stronger institutional 
development boosts the innovation performance of Chinese EMEs. Institutional development in a given 
country depends on various factors such as: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and 
absence of violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of Law, and (6) control 
of corruption (World Bank, 2010). Voice and accountability reflect key dimensions of democracy of a 
country. Democratic institutions help to control for the use of power by government (De Haan & 
Siermann, 1995), ensuring that government policies including those for innovation are well aligned with 
the interest of innovators and the public. Democracies can protect property and facilitate human 
development (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999), which in turn encourages investment in 
innovation. Second, political stability affects economic growth by influencing investment in physical and 
human capital (Aisen & Veiga, 2013). A stable political environment reduces uncertainty (Schneider & 
Frey, 1985; Rodrik, 1989) and encourages innovators to take new innovative initiatives. Third, effective 
governments can provide high quality civil services, such as education, which facilitates knowledge 
diffusion and human development (Kaufmann et al., 1999). Fourth, a high quality regulatory framework 
reduces agency and transaction costs (Parker, 1999), help firms overcome information asymmetries, and 
protect intellectual property (World Bank, 2001), thereby promoting innovative activities. Fifth, rule of 
laws that are well-defined and transparent encourage investment, entrepreneurship and innovative 
activities. Laws on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, for example, prohibit non-rights holders 
from using proprietary knowledge and thus limit opportunities for imitation (Maskus, 2000, p. 8). Hence, 
EMEs operating in host countries with well-developed IPR laws can reduce the probability of imitation 
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and protect their innovation output. Finally, corruption depresses investment in R&D because it increases 
uncertainty, transaction costs and the risk of expropriation (De Rosa, Gooroochurn & Görg, 2010).  
Therefore, in host countries with stronger institutional development, EMEs can capitalize on 
institutional advantages to develop stronger technological capabilities (Makino, Lau & Yeh, 2002; Wu, 
2013). Foreign subsidiaries in such markets have more opportunities to gain access to advanced 
technologies, broaden their innovation networks and benefit from innovation intermediaries which, in turn, 
enhances the innovation performance of the parent. In contrast, in host countries with lower levels of 
institutional development, foreign affiliates are likely to engage in costly market transactions and less 
efficient transformation, which hampers their ability to innovate productively and contribute to the 
innovation performance of the parent. Hence:  
H1. The stronger the institutional development of the host countries in which an EME’s portfolio of 
subsidiaries operates, the higher innovation performance of its parent.  
 
2.3. Moderating role of state ownership  
State ownership is an important institutional dimension in emerging markets (Hong, Wang & Kafouros, 
2015) and can influence EMEs’ internationalization in two ways. One the one hand, EMEs with a higher 
level of state ownership face strong governmental pressures that may force them to expand overseas 
(Wang et al., 2012b), even if this is not a strategically optimal decision. On the other hand, strong ties 
with government allow EMEs to enjoy privileged access to resources through non-market channels. This 
in turn facilitates international expansion (Hong et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2012b).  
We argue that although a higher level of institutional development in the host country enhances 
innovation performance, this effect may be negatively moderated by the level of state ownership in the 
internationalizing EME. Prior research suggests that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to 
enter countries with weak institutions and with rules similar to those in their home country (e.g., Buckley 
et al., 2007) because they are more comfortable with the way local markets and governments operate and, 
as a result, face lower liabilities of foreignness. In such environments, the ’perceived’ institutional 
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barriers are lower and adaptation costs are reduced, enabling EMEs to innovate in a similar way they do 
at home (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).  
In contrast, EMEs with a higher level of state ownership will face significant liability of foreignness 
when innovating in countries with more developed institutions because of institutional misalignment. 
Because they are used to opaque and less munificent home environments (Buckley et al., 2007; Wang et 
al., 2012b), these firms are less able to adapt to the environment in which institutions are more 
transparent, predictable and efficient and in which market forces dominate over government forces 
(Duanmu, 2012). Such environments discourage SOEs from using non-market mechanisms to build 
competitive advantages (Wang et al., 2012b) as they do at home. Although SOEs may shift 
management’s attention to efficiency, profitability and innovation in such environments, institutional 
misalignment makes it difficult for them to take advantage of well-developed markets and to coordinate 
factors for innovative activities. We should also note however, that ownership ties with government may 
also reduce innovativeness because firms often have to accommodate social concerns and needs of the 
government (Ramamurti, 2000). Such ties can also lead to resource lock-in and a high degree of resource 
iteration, lowering therefore firms’ ability to innovate.  
EMEs with lower levels of state ownership, including private firms, face different home institutional 
environment from SOEs. Because of their weak ties with government, they face unfair competition at 
home and are less able to access external resources through nonmarket channels (Nee, 1992) and 
therefore expand abroad to seek stronger institutions (Luo et al., 2010). Furthermore, because they are 
affected by discriminatory policies at home and are less competent in operating in burdensome institutional 
environments (Duanmu, 2012), non-state EMEs may benefit from entering foreign markets in which such 
discrimination is lower or absent. Hence, we propose:    
H2: An EME’s level of state ownership negatively moderates the effect of host-country 
institutional development on innovation performance of its parent.  
 
2.4. The moderating role of absorptive capacity  
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Although expansion into a host country with a more developed institutional environment allows EMEs to 
take advantage of high-quality institutions and acquire advanced technologies, they are not all equally able 
to exploit such institutional advantages and augment their innovation. According to the resource-based 
view (RBV), we argue that the extent to which a firm can take advantage of host-institutions is a function of 
its own absorptive capacity. EMEs with strong absorptive capacity are more sensitive to coercive pressures 
and changing norms (Wang et al., 2012b). Strong absorptive capacity may help EMEs respond well to 
institutional pressures by imitating local institutionalized practices increasing the legitimacy and likelihood 
of survival in the new environment. This in turn reduces uncertainty (Wang et al., 2012b) and helps EMEs 
exploit institutional advantages more effectively and improves their innovation performance.  
Innovation and information intermediaries, for example, are key elements of an innovative 
environment because they reduce transaction costs and facilitate information dissemination and adoption 
(Mantel & Rosegger, 1987). Although host markets with strong institutions provide high-quality 
intermediary services, only EMEs with stronger capabilities are able to take advantage of such services 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000). In contrast, firms with inadequate capabilities are less capable of responding to 
and exploiting such host-country institutional conditions (Makino et al., 2002), which hinders their ability 
to innovate. Similarly, universities (key components of a country’s innovation system) in developed 
markets provide a pool of knowledge and specialized labor that constitutes a crucial element of intellectual 
human capital (Kafouros et al., 2014). Although collaboration with universities enables firms to lower 
search costs, acquire scientific talent and knowledge (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2002), EMEs with weak 
absorptive capacity are not able to exploit such advantages and develop their innovation capabilities. 
Furthermore, stronger absorptive capacity can bridge distant technological contexts (Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003), helps firms recognize gaps in the technological landscape (Miller, Fern & Cardinal, 2007) 
and acquire complementary assets to develop new capabilities. Because knowledge is highly localized, 
only EMEs with higher absorptive capacity can improve their innovation performance by cognitively 
processing various sources of information, utilizing and integrating knowledge, and reducing transaction 
costs associated with external technology acquisition. Furthermore,  EMEs with higher absorptive 
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capability are in a unique position to develop innovations from knowledge recombination by integrating 
home and foreign knowledge. Thus, we propose the following:   
H3. An EME’s absorptive capacity positively moderates the effect of the host-country 
institutional development on innovation performance of its parent. 
 
2.5. The moderating role of geographic diversity of foreign subsidiaries 
Countries differ not only on their level of institutional development but importantly, also on the 
strength and availability of the types of innovation-supporting institutions (Edquist, 1997; Nelson, 
1993). For example, India has a well-developed educational institutional infrastructure that provides 
high-qualified human talent at low-labor cost (Hedge & Hicks, 2008) but has less-developed 
regulatory institutions (Hoskisson et al., 2013), while USA has an abundance of well-developed 
capital markets (e.g., stock exchange, advanced banking system, venture capitals, etc.) that can 
provide access to funds for innovation projects (Wan, 2005) but the country is also facing a 
decreasing supply of high-qualified science and engineering graduates (Lewin, Massini & Peeters, 
2009). Even the same type of institutions can differ between countries. For example, institutional 
differences in intellectual property protection system, such as the rule of ‘first-to-invent’ and 
‘first-to-file’ in the USA and Japan respectively, have important consequences on the innovation 
behavior of firms in the two countries (van Waarden, 2001). This kind of cross country institutional 
differences influence not only the willingness and ability of internationalized firms’ subsidiaries to 
innovate but importantly also the related outcomes and benefits that can be transferred back to the 
parent and positively influence innovation development. We, therefore, hypothesize that a broad or 
narrow internationalization affects differently the positive effects of institutional development on the 
parent’s innovation performance.  
First, through broad geographic diversification subsidiary units can access and learn from 
different and diverse innovation supporting institutions, enhance their capabilities and organization 
learning and improve their innovation performance (Bertrand & Capron, 2014). For example, 
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diversifying in many different host countries with well-developed educational institutions 
subsidiaries enhance their innovation performance by accessing large varieties of basic and 
exploratory researches in emerging technologies that are often unique and location-specific to 
individual countries (Phene & Almeida, 2008). This increases the diversity and variety of ideas that 
flow in the MNE and which are transferred back to the parent  creating richer knowledge structures 
and fostering innovation back home (Barkema & Vermuelen, 1998). By contrast, firms 
internationalizing in only a handful of locations with well-developed institutions cannot benefit as 
much, as the narrower set of knowledge accessed abroad result in narrower or even familiar 
knowledge transferred to the parent, which limits its innovation potential.  
Second, through interactions with various types of institutions, subsidiary firms can learn how 
to conform to or build a degree of independence from prevailing institutional norms and gain a 
“common understanding of what is appropriate and fundamentally meaningful behavior” (Oliver, 
1991). In other words, embeddedness in multiple institutional contexts develops organizational 
learning and flexibility to deploy different strategic responses (i.e. resist or conform) to institutional 
pressures and expectations (Oliver, 1991). Such knowhow of ‘how to deal with foreign institutions’ 
is then shared with the parent which augments its existing competencies. This country-specific 
knowledge and subsidiary-specific experience improves the parent’s understanding of foreign 
institutions, reduces transaction costs associated with technological collaboration with foreign 
partners and therefore enhances its innovation performance. By contrast, although firms can exploit 
host-country institutional advantages, those subsidiaries that operate on a narrow set of countries can 
only gain access to fewer and less diverse innovation supporting institutions. This can limit the 
positive benefits that host-country institutions have on internationalized firms’ innovation 
performance. Therefore, even when two firms have located operations in countries with similar level 
of institutional development, their parents’ innovation performance may differ because of the 
differences in the breath of geographic reach of their foreign subsidiaries. Hence, we propose the 
following:  
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H4. The higher the level of an EME’s geographic diversity of its foreign subsidiaries, the 
greater the positive effect of the host-country institutional development on innovation 
performance of its parent. 
 
2.6. The moderating role of entry mode 
Firms’ strategic responses and conformity to host-country institutional pressures and expectations is 
driven by their quest for legitimacy from important regulators, suppliers of critical resources, 
customers and broader audiences (Miller, Breton-Miller & Lester, 2013). Nevertheless, because 
businesses operate in competitive environments the speed and ease with which subsidiary firms 
manage to conform (or respond) to the institutional environment of the host country in relation to 
their competitors is critical for their innovation performance. Therefore, although subsidiary firms 
operating abroad are exposed to the same institutional advantages in a host-country, they are not able 
to benefit equally from such institutions. We argue that this depends on the entry mode (JV vs WOS) 
that an internationalized firm uses.  
First, through their partner firms in a JV, EMEs can create bridges with their partners’ other 
alliances, achieve institutional and social acceptance and overcome the liability of foreignness and 
un-connectedness (Vasudeva et al., 2013). JVs are also frequently more acceptable forms of foreign 
investment by host governments, which enables faster access to innovation supporting institutions 
compared to WOS (Pangarkar & Lim, 2003). Furthermore, the ‘high-control’ transactions involved 
in JVs (like interactions with the partner’s suppliers, customers, contacts and its extended network) 
increase the breadth, depth and speed of learning and emdeddedness with the local business 
environment and institutions (Zahra, Ireland & Hitt, 2000). This stronger commitment and 
involvement develops deeper understanding and assimilation of the institutional advantages a 
host-country offers which, when combined with the increased (and also faster and easier) legitimacy 
and acceptance internationalized firms gain from JVs, enable subsidiary firms to improve their 
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innovation capabilities and subsequently transfer those back to the parent enhancing its innovation 
performance.   
Second, well-developed institutional environments entail head-to-head competition and 
self-sufficiency between rival firms (Vasudeva et al., 2013). In other words a relative abundance of 
innovation supporting institutions tends to encourage firms to pursue more individualistic innovation 
strategies that aim to lead and dominate their competitors. Further, highly competitive environments 
force firms to accelerate learning, acquisition of knowledge and improve innovation performance to 
survive and beat competitors. JVs enable subsidiaries to acquire knowledge, that is lacking, time 
consuming and difficult to develop on their own, from its partner and the partner’s other alliances 
(Inkpen, 2000). For example, acquisition of knowledge regarding how to collaborate with local 
research institutes, suppliers and innovation supporting intermediaries fosters subsidiaries’ 
experiential learning and enables them to capitalize better and faster on the well-developed 
institutions, and survive the intense competition. In turn, both the immediate advantages from such 
learning (i.e. innovations developed by the subsidiary) and the accumulated knowhow on how to 
innovate, survive and grow in highly competitive and individualistic environments can be channeled 
to the parent’s knowledge bases enhancing its innovation performance. By contrast, WOS act more 
in line with Schumpeter’s ‘lone entrepreneur’ model (1942) and, therefore, incur higher transaction 
costs and time-compression diseconomies (e.g. extensive trial and error in forming alliances, finding 
suppliers and building networks with local agents) and liabilities of foreignness in attempting to learn 
and benefit from the host-country’s institutional advantages. Hence, as WOS replicate more 
individualistic strategies they will be slower and less capable of assimilating the foreign countries’ 
institutional benefits and develop innovation capabilities. We propose: 
H5. The positive effect of the host-country institutional development on its innovation 
performance of the parent firm will be stronger when the foreign subsidiary is a joint venture 
than when it is a wholly owned subsidiary.  
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The theoretical framework is summarized in Figure 1.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Data and sampling 
We tested our hypotheses using a panel dataset of internationalized Chinese firms. The data were collected 
from three sources. First, we obtained financial and ownership information of internationalized Chinese 
firms from China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) databases. This is developed by GA 
information Technology, a leading financial database provider in China. Second, we obtained patent data 
from China’s State Intellectual Property Office, which provides information such as patent application, 
patent granted and patent assignee. Third, we collected the information about EMEs’ overseas subsidiaries 
from their annual reports. We limited the scope of the study to manufacturing industries for two reasons. 
Chinese manufacturing firms were active in venturing overseas during the study period, and the 
manufacturing firms are more likely to apply for patents for their innovative outputs. This allows us to 
accurately measure innovation performance. We cross-checked the data from the annual reports of the 
sample companies to accurately identify the number of overseas subsidiaries, the location of each overseas 
subsidiary and the year of establishing the subsidiary. We then matched this information with the 
corporate-level financial and patent data. The final sample comprises of 599 internationalized Chinese 
EMEs across 18 three-digit manufacturing industries that have established 2,430 subsidiaries across 82 
countries during the period of 2000 and 2010.  
 
3.2. Measures 
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
We measured the dependent variable, parent innovation performance, using the number of patents 
granted to the parent firm each year during the sample period. These innovations occurred within China 
where the parent firm operates and as a result the respective patents are also granted to the parent firm in 
the same country. These patents may come from innovations generated both at home and through 
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knowledge acquisition from subsidiaries. Our measure captures the “flow” rather than stock of patents and 
excludes the patents originated prior to the internationalization activities of the firm. Patents measure 
something “above and beyond R&D inputs, a creation of an underlying knowledge stock” (Hall, Griliches 
& Hausman, 1986) and provide an observable indicator of a firm’s technological capabilities (Adegbesan 
& Higgins, 2010). Patent data can accurately capture the intellectual property of a firm and therefore have 
been widely used to measure innovation performance (e.g., Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001; Adegbesan & 
Higgins, 2010; Salomon & Jin, 2010).  
3.2.2. Independent and moderating variables 
Our key independent variable is host-country institutional development of the foreign country in 
which an EME is active. This variable is constructed as a composite measure of six institutional aspects 
from World Governance Indicators: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The World Bank 
database provides information on these indicators for 210 countries for the period of 2000 to 2010. This 
index is often used in studies that examine cross-country differences in institutional environments (e.g., 
Kaufmann, Kray & Mastruzzi, 2003). Because each of the six indicators includes multiple sub-items, the 
composite measure takes into account many aspects of the institutional development of a country, including 
not only governance systems but also educational, religious, governmental and legal systems. For example, 
government effectiveness reflects the “quality of primary education” (which is subtracted from World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report) and the “satisfaction with education system” (from 
Gallup World Poll).  
These six indicators are highly correlated (Cronbach alpha > 0.95), indicating a high degree of 
reliability of our composite measure. We submitted these six indicators to factor analysis to arrive at a 
single factor. A higher value of the measure represents a higher level of host-country institutional 
development. Table 1 shows the values of institutional development of the 82 host countries in which the 
sampled Chinese firms established operations during the period of 2000-2010.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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To operationalize the two moderating variables, state ownership and absorptive capacity, we obtained 
information from the CSMAR database. This database reports detailed information on the ownership 
structure of the sampled Chinese firms. State ownership is defined as the share of state-owned paid-in 
capital over the total paid-in capital of the firm. Various measures have been used to capture a firm's 
absorptive capacity (Zahra & George, 2002). Because it is strongly related to the total R&D expenditures 
of a firm, an established measure of absorptive capacity is the firm’s own R&D spending (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). We thus measure absorptive capacity by dividing each firm’s 
R&D expenditures by its total sales. 
To operationalize geographic diversity of a firm’s international expansion, we obtained the 
geographic distance of host countries from Berry, Guillen & Zhou (2010) and computed the Herfindahl 
index of overseas subsidiaries across markets and used it to proxy geographic diversity. We 
operationalized JV by generating a variable, which takes the value of one if the entry mode of an overseas 
subsidiary is joint venture, and takes the value of zero, if its entry mode is wholly owned subsidiary. The 
distinction between joint venture and wholly owned is determined by the percentage of equity of an 
overseas subsidiary owned by the parent firms. Following prior studies (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; 
Hennart, 1991; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996), we classified an overseas subsidiary as JV if the parent firm 
owned more than 95 percent of the share and as WOS otherwise.  
 3.2.3. Control variables 
First, we controlled for firm size, which was measured by a firm’s total assets. We applied a natural 
logarithm transformation to this variable to normalize it. Second, we included firm age, measured by the 
number of years elapsed since the establishment of the firm.  
Third, because marketing capability can enhance the performance benefits of internationalization by 
enabling firms to market new products in the foreign markets and boost bargaining power with suppliers 
and distributors (Kotabe et al., 2002), we include marketing capabilities which is defined by the ratio of 
marketing expenses divided by sales revenue. Fourth, because it takes some time for the institutional 
quality effect to be materialized, we included a variable, the no. of years of foreign presence, which is 
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measured as the number of the years in which the firm has been active in the host country. Fifth, to 
control for the potential effects of the concentration of the size of the investment across the host countries 
a Chinese EME entered, we included distribution of investment size by computing a Herfindahl indicator 
based on the distribution of investment size across countries.  
Sixth, because the level of institutional development varies across subnational regions within the 
home country, we followed Wang et al. (2012) and included Region-specific home institutional 
development to control for this effect. This operationalization adopted the marketization index developed 
by Fan, Wang and Zhu (2006) for 2005. This comprehensive composite index evaluates the levels of 
economic freedom in five key areas including the role of market relative to government, the 
development of the private sector, the development of commodity and factor markets, and the 
development of free market institutions. A higher value of the marketization index indicates a higher 
level of market-based system in a region. Finally, since the sampled firms were from multiple industries, 
we controlled for industry effect by generating multiple industry (three digit) dummy variables and 
including them in the regression analyses.    
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The variance inflation 
factor values ranged from 1.23 to 4.68, well below the cutoff threshold of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & 
Black, 1998). Thus, multicollinearity appears not to be a major concern. Nevertheless, we mean-centered 
variables in the interaction terms to avoid problems of multicollinearity and increase interpretability of 
interactions (Aiken & West, 1991). We also lagged all the explanatory variables for one year, taking into 
consideration the time needed for the effects of host-country institutions to materialize and influence 
innovation of the parent firm. The adoption of a lag structure may also help control for potential 
endogeneity.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.3. Statistical modeling 
Because our dependent variable is measured by the number of patents granted to a firm, a linear 
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regression model is not appropriate and will lead to biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. 
Therefore, we adopt the categorical data regression model to perform the analysis (Agresti, 2002). With the 
categorical data regression model, one key concern is that the variance may exceed the mean, as Table 2 
shows. Poison regression is often employed to deal with the problems associated with the use of count data 
for dependent variables, but its limitation lies in the assumption that the variance of the dependent variable 
must equal the mean. To overcome this limitation, we adopt the negative binomial count regression 
model. The negative binomial model allows the mean of the dependent variable to vary. The conditional 
expectation of the count dependent variable is specified as 
                                        (1)                                           
       
where  is a set of explanatory variables,  is the coefficient,  is the random error, and  and  
are two random variables.  is assumed to be subject to one parameter Gamma distribution. The 
probability density function of  with one parameter  can be specified as follows: 
                           (2)                                         
After integrating  out of the probability density function specified in Eq.(2), we obtain the following 
marginal negative binominal distribution: 
                            (3) 
where the negative binomial distribution has a mean of  and a variance of  
.  With Eq.(3) being specified, the maximum likelihood method can be used to 
estimate the model.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
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Table 3 provides the estimation results. The log-likelihood ratio indicates strong explanatory power of 
all models. The changes in this ratio across models indicate significant increases in explanatory power in 
those restricted models (Models 4 - 8) compared with Models 1 and 2.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Model 1 serves as the baseline model because it includes control variables only. The variable for 
host-country institutional development is added to Model 2. The coefficient of this variable is positive 
and statistically significant, and it remains so in Models 3 - 8. This indicates that EMEs’ international 
venturing into host countries with a higher level of institutional development has a positive effect on the 
innovation performance of the parent firm. Thus, H1 is supported.  
Model 3 adds four moderating variables, state ownership, absorptive capacity, geographic diversity 
and entry mode, and models 4-8 include their interactions with host-country institutional development, 
respectively. The coefficient of the interaction term in Model 4 is negative and significant, indicating that 
state ownership weakens the relationship between the level of host-country institutional development and 
parent innovation performance of the investing firm. H2 is thus corroborated. Similarly, the interaction 
term in Model 5 is positive and significant, indicating that stronger absorptive capacity strengthens the 
focal relationship. This result supports H3. H4 is also supported as the coefficient of the interaction term 
in Model 6 is also positive and significant. Our results, however, do not provide support for H5 as the 
coefficient of the interaction term in Model 7 is statistically insignificant. As a robustness check, Model 8 
is a full model which includes all independent variables and interaction terms. As can be seen, the key 
results concerning the host-country institutional development variable and the four interaction terms 
remain qualitatively unchanged. To better explain the moderating effects of state ownership and 
absorptive capacity, these relationships are presented in Figures 2a and 2b.  
[Insert Figures 2a& 2b about here] 
4.2. Further analyses 
Firms with higher innovation performance may selectively enter countries with a higher level of 
institutional development, causing concerns of endogeneity which threatens our empirical strategy. We 
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control for the possible estimation biases in several ways. We alleviated this potential source of bias by 
including several variables that account for firm characteristics. We also used lagged independent 
variables to reduce the potential endogeneity bias, if any. For example, when host-country institutional 
development is lagged by one year, it is less likely that the parent innovation performance at year t affects 
the institutional development in year t-1. 
Further, we followed Wang et al’s (2012b) two-stage least square method to deal with the issue of 
endogeneity. The test procedure involves three steps. Since it is difficult to carry out negative binomial 
regression model using instrumental variables, the first step is to apply logarithm transformation to the 
dependent variable, the number of patents granted. Then we run the fixed effect model using the 
specification of Model 2 in Table 3. The results from the fixed-effect model are very similar to those from 
the negative binomial regression. The second stage involves choosing a valid instrument for the 
host-country institutional development variable. A valid instrument should be highly correlated with the 
explanatory variable but not with the error term. We followed Gujarati and Porter (2009) and used lagged 
(for two years) institutional development as the instrument. We then conducted an exclusion restriction test 
in which we regressed the residuals of the second stage estimation on the instrumental variable. The test 
has the p-value of 0.405 indicating that the instrumental variable is not significant and is indeed 
perpendicular to the error term. Then the third step is to carry out the Hausman (1978) test to compare 
with the 2SLS (with the instrument variable of host-country institutional development) and the fixed 
effects model. The null hypothesis is that the fixed effects and 2SLS are not systematically different. The 
Hausman statistics has a value of 11.99 with the p-value of 0.101, which is not significant at 5%. This 
suggests that the host-country institutional development variable is not endogenous and our estimated 
results are not biased.  
To further check the robustness of the results, we replaced the host-country institutional 
development variable with host-country national innovation systems. National innovation systems refer to 
configurations of institutions that foster the development of technology and innovation (Nelson & 
Rosenberg, 1993). Our operationalization of this variable adopts the scores reported in the Global 
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Innovation Index (GII) from ‘The Global Innovation Index 2014: The Human Factor in Innovation’ 
which is the result of a collaboration between Cornell University, INSEAD, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO)1. The GII score is the composite measured by seven pillars and each pillar 
is divided into three sub-pillars. The main seven pillars include institutions, human capital and research, 
infrastructure, market sophistication, business sophistication, knowledge and technology outputs and 
creative outputs. A higher value of the index indicates a higher level of national innovation system. As 
shown in Table 3A, the results using the national innovation systems are qualitatively similar to those 
reported above. These results provide further support for our hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 3A about here] 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This study developed an integrative framework that theoretically articulated and empirically tested 
the effects of a host country’s institutional development on the innovation performance of 
internationalizing EMEs parent back home and explored how these effects are contingent on firm-specific 
idiosyncrasies (i.e. level of state ownership and absorptive capacity) and internationalized strategies (i.e. 
geographic diversification and foreign entry mode). Our analysis shows that the internationalization 
configuration of foreign subsidiaries systematically affects innovations of the parent in addition to any 
unique home-based innovations. Specifically, the study shows that on average innovation performance of 
the parent is greater for firms expanding into host countries with stronger than weaker institutional 
development. Furthermore, we find that the role of a host country’s institutional development in 
promoting innovation is greater for EMEs with stronger absorptive capacity. We further demonstrate that 
parents’ innovation performance is enhanced when EMEs’ portfolio of subsidiary units is located in 
geographical diverse and institutionally well-developed countries. However, we also find that a lower 
level of institutional development in the host country may actually enhance innovation performance when 
                                                 
1 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/content.aspx?page=data-analysis  
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the level of state ownership in the internationalizing EME is high. In addition, contrary to our predictions 
we found no support that parent firm innovation performance benefits more via JV to well-developed 
institutional countries as opposed to WOS entry mode. Our analysis contributes to the growing body of 
research on EMEs’ internationalization strategies and innovation performance in several ways. 
 
5.1. Theoretical implications   
First, we demonstrate that the effects of host-country institutional development may spread beyond 
national boundaries to boost innovation performance of the parent internationalizing EME. The results 
suggest that well-developed institutions compensate for disadvantages of liability of foreignness (Hymer, 
1976) and in fact enable foreign firms to get access to knowledge and resources which enhance their 
innovation performance back home. Adding to the emerging institution-based explanations of the rise of 
EMEs as innovators (e.g., Wang et al., 2015) that largely focus on the role of home-country institutions, 
we posit that the institutional and knowledge gap between the host market and the home market becomes 
conducive to reverse learning and knowledge opportunities for internationalized EMEs (Bertrand & 
Capron, 2014). Combined with the finding that a strategy of international expansion in geographical 
diverse and institutionally well-developed countries increases a firm’s innovation performance our results, 
therefore, support the comparative institutional perspective that firms venture overseas in order to 
arbitrage institutional differences between home- and host- countries and enhance their performance (e.g., 
Luo et al. 2010). Our results open up avenues for future research to explore in more detail how (e.g., 
identify which mechanisms enable reverse knowledge transfers and what is the optimum level of 
geographic diversification before costs outweigh the benefits) the level of institutional development of a 
host-country affects internationalized firms’ innovation performance back home. Such understanding can 
offer a new explanation for the sources of competitive advantages enabling EMEs to innovate and 
compete with their advanced rivals on a home and global scale (Kafouros, Wang, Piperopoulos & Zhang, 
2014). 
Second, our research shows that though EMEs may perceive a greater investment risk in 
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institutionally less-developed countries, those with a higher level of state ownership can actually boost 
innovation performance because of its similarity to their home environments. On surface, this finding 
seems to contradict the view that ‘institutional voids’ hamper innovation performance by increasing 
transaction costs and making transformation less efficient for foreign subsidiaries (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000). Our finding is actually intriguing because it suggests that well-developed institutions are not 
always beneficial for EMEs’ innovation success and that not all EMEs should enter institutionally 
well-developed host countries. Our study thus, offers ‘partial’ support to the view that some 
location-bound advantages in a host country are specific to a particular group of firms only (Dunning, 
1998).  
Third, we show that although institutional development in the host country has a significant and 
independent effect on innovation performance, well-developed institutions alone might not be enough for 
enhancing innovation. Rather, firms need to develop strong absorptive capacity that enables them to 
“address a myriad of complex cultural issues, different political environments, and regulatory 
requirements” (Zahra & Hayton, 2008). This finding supports the view that firms are not equally able to 
exploit favourable institutional environment and diverse knowledge sources (e.g., Zahra & Hayton, 2008). 
While prior perspectives suggest that the RBV and institution-based view are competing rather than 
complementary and have limited researchers’ ability to explain variations in innovation performance, this 
study is one of the first to examine how institutional factors and firm capabilities (i.e. RBV) jointly affect 
a firm’s innovation performance, an approach that, according to Meyer & Peng (2005) and Yamakawa et 
al. (2008), is necessary and highly promising.  
Finally, although theory on global alliances predicts that learning from the partner (especially when 
certain knowledge is tacit) and gaining legitimacy and access to their social networks in the new 
environment is the preferred strategy for firms looking to upgrade their capabilities (Kurokawa, Iwata & 
Roberts, 2007; Vasudeva et al., 2013), we find that JVs will not reinforce further the positive effects of 
host-country’s institutional development on the parent’s innovation performance. A possible explanation 
has to do with the fact that the extant literature does not provide a clear distinction regarding which entry 
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mode is best for venturing abroad (e.g. Cui & Jiang, 2009; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 2009) and in 
fact suggests that both WOS and JVs are used equally successful by EMEs in their quest for accessing 
and assimilating resources and advanced capabilities from abroad (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009).  
  
5.2. Managerial implications    
Our findings also offer valuable guidelines for globally focused managers from emerging economies who 
aim to enhance innovation performance through internationalization. First, although strong institutions 
may facilitate innovation performance, EME managers should realize that they do not always need to seek 
strong institutions when expanding overseas but instead, they should look for countries with a similar 
level of institutional development to their home countries if their firms have a higher level of state 
ownership. Second, our study suggests that EMEs should develop absorptive capacity which will enable 
them to take advantage of the institutional development in the host country. Further, EME managers 
should also be aware that diversifying into geographically dispersed locations with well-developed 
institutions is more beneficial than locating their company’s portfolio of subsidiaries in only a few 
countries. 
We, therefore, suggest that innovation business models resting on the combination of location and 
diversification choice strategy and development of internal absorptive capacity is the most fruitful 
mechanism for increasing innovation through internationalization. Thus, before venturing abroad, EME 
managers should consider whether institutions in a particular host country are conducive to their 
innovative activities, how they can improve their absorptive capacity to exploit the institutional 
advantages in the chosen host country and finally select a broad (instead of a narrow) set of 
geographically diverse countries to target their outward investments. 
 
5.3. Limitations and further research 
This research has several limitations. First, our empirical data rely on one country (i.e. China), and thus 
our findings may not be equally generalizable to other emerging countries because of the peculiarity of 
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organizational structure, government actions, and/or the institutional setting associated with China. 
Therefore, a useful avenue for research would be to explore whether our hypothesized relationships hold 
true for internationalizing EMEs from other emerging economies. Second, our measurement of innovation 
performance relied on patents; however, not all innovations are patentable, and a patent-based measure 
does not incorporate market acceptance of related products (Liu & Buck, 2007). Because institutional 
environments may influence various forms of innovation (e.g., new product introduction and process 
innovation) in different ways, different findings may emerge when innovation performance is 
operationalized by new product introduction or measures not directly related to patents. Third, this study 
attached great importance to absorptive capacity, which is essentially proxied by technological 
capabilities. Researchers may explore the relationship between the host-country institutional environment 
and innovation performance by examining how other types of capabilities (e.g., operational capabilities 
and management quality) moderate the focal relationship. Finally, we considered two types of foreign 
entry mode, namely JV and WOS. Future research should also explore acquisitions as an FDI strategy, 
particularly as many EMEs seem to favor this type of entry mode. 
Despite some limitations, our study contributes to institutional and innovation theories about the 
effects of host-country institutional development on parent EMEs’ innovation performance. The findings 
suggest that EMEs’ parents overcome their internal constraints and obstacles related to under-developed 
home-country institutions by investing in foreign countries and tapping into their institutional settings to 
enhance their organizational learning, acquire diverse ideas and mental models, enrich their knowledge 
bases and upgrade their capabilities. Through a process of reverse knowledge transfer from the subsidiaries 
to the parent, EMEs enhance their innovation performance back home and thus are able to counter-attack 
major global rivals operating in their home-markets and abroad (Luo & Tung, 2007). We, thus, concur with 
recent arguments that internationalized EMEs initially go abroad to obtain technologies and resources 
primarily for exploitation in their home countries and once they secure greater ownership advantages and a 
stronger foothold in their own countries, (re)enter the global competitive markets (Ramamurti, 2012). 
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Table 1 
List of host countries and the index of institutional development. 
 
Country Institutional 
development 
index 
Country Institutional 
development 
index 
Country Institutional 
development 
index 
New Zealand 1.97 Poland 0.75 Indonesia -0.40 
Norway 1.96 Seychelles 0.70 Cote d'Ivoire -0.40 
Denmark 1.94 Korea, Rep. 0.65 Vietnam -0.44 
Finland 1.91 Malaysia 0.62 Gabon -0.46 
Switzerland 1.90 Mauritius 0.62 
Papua New 
Guinea -0.47 
Netherlands 1.90 Uruguay 0.61 Ecuador -0.53 
Luxembourg 1.87 Samoa 0.60 Kyrgyz Republic -0.56 
Sweden 1.87 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.54 Colombia -0.56 
Austria 1.84 Lithuania 0.47 Zimbabwe -0.58 
United Kingdom 1.81 South Africa 0.43 Mali -0.61 
Canada 1.80 Slovak Republic 0.43 Uganda -0.62 
Germany 1.71 Thailand 0.35 Russian  -0.70 
Singapore 1.70 Macau, China 0.33 Pakistan -0.71 
Australia 1.68 Argentina 0.18 Zambia -0.73 
United States 1.58 Jordan 0.13 Kenya -0.74 
Cayman Islands 1.55 Morocco 0.09 Ukraine -0.75 
Belgium 1.49 India -0.02 Bangladesh -0.81 
Spain 1.37 Philippines -0.02 Lao PDR -0.82 
France 1.37 Mongolia -0.08 Iran, -0.82 
Portugal 1.34 Sri Lanka -0.09 Cambodia -0.90 
Bermuda 1.27 Brazil -0.11 Kazakhstan -1.00 
Japan 1.14 Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.11 Ethiopia -1.12 
Hong Kong, 
China 1.11 Turkey -0.12 Nigeria -1.16 
Italy 0.90 Saudi Arabia -0.18 Uzbekistan -1.23 
Hungary 0.87 Bolivia -0.24 Myanmar -1.51 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 0.85 Ghana -0.26 Tajikistan -1.62 
Czech Republic 0.85 Mexico -0.32 
Taiwan, China 0.82 Bulgaria -0.34 
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Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Parent innovation performance 10.321 49.685 1            
(2) Firm age 11.281 4.791 0.003 1           
(3) Firm size 7.973 1.153 0.218 0.155 1          
(4) Marketing capability 0.069 0.079 -0.025 -0.025 -0.069 1         
(5) Distribution of investment size 0.404 0.456 0.03 0.139 0.101 0.062 1        
(6) Region-specific home institutional development 2.056 2.711 0.197 -0.207 -0.017 0.01 -0.101 1       
(7) No. of years of foreign presence 2.328 1.006 0.077 0.387 0.362 -0.037 0.225 -0.062 1      
(8) Host-country Institutional development 0.067 0.549 0.061 -0.046 -0.013 0.008 0.16 0.018 -0.077 1     
(9) State ownership 0.148 0.223 0.153 0.021 0.227 -0.085 -0.113 0.147 0.038 0.042 1    
(10) Absorptive capacity 0.002 0.02 0.245 -0.003 -0.059 0.06 0.021 -0.045 0.012 0.025 0.014 1   
(11) Geographic diversity 2.761 4.388 0.09 0.009 0.203 -0.01 0.059 0.044 0.538 -0.098 -0.028 0.014 1  
(12) Entry mode 0.067 0.249 -0.011 0.086 0.068 0.023 0.226 -0.022 0.09 -0.09 0.016 0.086 0.001 1 
Correlations with an absolute value greater than .03 are significant at p <.05. 
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Table 3 Negative binomial regression analyses of parent innovation performance 
                               (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)        (5)        (6)        (7)        (8)    
Constant                    -5.628***  -5.568*** -15.334    -15.551    -16.295    -15.597    -15.265    -16.775    
                           (-4.352)    (-4.311)    (-0.132)    (-0.158)    (-0.095)    (-0.112)    (-0.120)    (-0.073)    
Firm age                     0.010      0.011      0.025*     0.036**    0.025*     0.018      0.017      0.016    
                           (0.841)    (0.973)    (2.183)    (3.191)    (2.170)    (1.549)    (1.502)    (1.405)    
Firm size                    0.462***   0.455***   0.266***   0.342***   0.278***   0.262***   0.227***   0.266*** 
                           (10.706)    (10.467)    (5.643)    (7.150)    (5.980)    (5.539)    (4.825)    (5.527)    
Marketing capability         -0.906     -0.882     -1.089+    -1.009+    -0.981+    -1.200*    -1.176*    -1.061+   
                           (-1.451)    (-1.406)    (-1.822)    (-1.725)    (-1.648)    (-2.019)    (-1.966)    (-1.785)    
Distribution of investment size  -0.437***  -0.495***  -0.439***  -0.500***  -0.458***  -0.421***  -0.447***  -0.504*** 
                           (-4.521)    (-5.063)    (-4.383)    (-5.006)    (-4.594)    (-4.182)    (-4.440)    (-4.862)    
Region-specific home institutional development   0.323***   0.319***   0.321***   0.330***   0.326***   0.321***   0.314***   0.321*** 
                           (15.514)    (15.448)    (15.744)    (16.380)    (16.190)    (15.742)    (15.472)    (16.015)    
No. of years of foreign presence   0.259***   0.252***   0.128+     0.061      0.141*     0.155*     0.177**    0.205**  
                           (5.652)    (5.480)    (1.947)    (0.928)    (2.156)    (2.340)    (2.697)    (3.065)    
Host-country institutional development               0.234**    0.132      0.209*     0.325***   0.200*     0.154+     0.474*** 
                                      (2.935)    (1.628)    (2.461)    (3.564)    (2.434)    (1.857)    (4.779)    
State ownership                                    1.102***   0.935***   1.006***   1.115***   1.096***   0.875*** 
                                                 (5.303)    (4.592)    (4.857)    (5.372)    (5.245)    (4.208)    
Absorptive capacity                                3.949+     3.025      5.702      3.796+     3.754+     3.716    
                                                 (1.798)    (1.595)    (1.159)    (1.742)    (1.779)    (0.779)    
Geographic diversity                               0.046**    0.057**    0.040**    0.012      0.038*    -0.010    
                                                 (2.745)    (3.259)    (2.597)    (0.632)    (2.383)    (-0.459)    
Entry mode                                        -0.529**   -0.565**   -0.582**   -0.533**   -0.537**   -0.622**  
                                                 (-2.791)    (-3.025)    (-3.071)    (-2.819)    (-2.814)    (-3.254)    
Host-country institutional development * State ownership                                   -1.998***                                   -1.859*** 
                                                            (-3.806)                                     (-3.511)    
Host country institutional development * Absorptive capacity                                              79.989***                        69.405*** 
                                                                       (4.529)                          (3.900)    
Host-country institutional development * Geographic diversity                                                          0.050***              0.061*** 
                                                                                  (3.477)               (3.308)    
Host-country institutional development * Entry mode                                                                     0.132      0.138    
                                                                                             (0.494)    (0.468)    
Industrial dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Log-Likelihood             -8495.61    -8491.75    -8482.22    -8469.46    -8468.99    -8478.55    -8487.23    -8462.29    
AIC                        17019.22    17013.50    17000.45    16976.91    16975.98    16995.10    17012.46    16968.59    
Degree of freedom               12         13         16         17         17         17         17         20    
Significance of model test    0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00    
Notes: The values reported are regression coefficients, with t-values given in parentheses; * indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.05 (** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001) level of confidence (two-tailed tests).  
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Table 3A Robustness analyses of parent innovation performance 
                               (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)        (5)        (6)        (7)        (8)    
Constant                    -6.653***  -6.609*** -19.319    -19.604     -7.090*** -19.404    -20.282    -17.814    
                           (-5.169)    (-5.135)    (-0.023)    (-0.022)    (-4.551)    (-0.023)    (-0.017)    (-0.054)    
Firm age                    -0.003     -0.002      0.013      0.015     -0.004      0.019+     0.015      0.032**  
                           (-0.276)    (-0.202)    (1.158)    (1.328)    (-0.331)    (1.696)    (1.327)    (2.845)    
Firm size                    0.529***   0.531***   0.209***   0.220***   0.728***   0.226***   0.224***   0.217*** 
                           (11.676)    (11.695)    (4.193)    (4.412)    (14.738)    (4.553)    (4.488)    (4.341)    
Marketing capability          0.947      0.921      0.121      0.180      1.430*     0.258      0.301      0.746    
                           (1.463)    (1.425)    (0.198)    (0.298)    (2.251)    (0.423)    (0.490)    (1.202)    
Distribution of investment size  -0.078     -0.338      0.044      0.002     -0.434      0.010      0.134     -0.085    
                           (-0.784)    (-1.235)    (0.158)    (0.006)    (-1.575)    (0.034)    (0.473)    (-0.298)    
Region-specific home institutional development   0.273***   0.273***   0.273***   0.276***   0.268***   0.284***   0.279***   0.282*** 
                           (13.293)    (13.308)    (13.090)    (13.404)    (13.078)    (13.581)    (13.317)    (13.716)    
No. of years of foreign presence   0.448***   0.426***   0.278**    0.274**    0.311***   0.250**    0.314***   0.253**  
                           (8.342)    (7.396)    (3.257)    (3.222)    (3.755)    (2.884)    (3.667)    (2.923)    
Host-country institutional development               0.005     -0.001     -0.001      0.009+    -0.000     -0.003      0.004    
                                      (1.015)    (-0.210)    (-0.131)    (1.800)    (-0.075)    (-0.503)    (0.844)    
State ownership                                    1.210***   1.228***   0.977***   1.257***   1.251***   1.322*** 
                                                 (5.941)    (6.086)    (4.917)    (6.205)    (6.146)    (6.489)    
Absorptive capacity                                3.272      2.895     -0.551      2.930      2.992     -2.257    
                                                 (1.463)    (1.365)    (-0.126)    (1.350)    (1.362)    (-0.520)    
Geographic diversity                               0.068***   0.070***   0.027*     0.072***   0.067***   0.079*** 
                                                 (4.660)    (4.777)    (2.276)    (4.547)    (4.580)    (5.053)    
Entry mode                                        -0.129     -0.181     -0.170     -0.139     -0.180     -0.235    
                                                 (-0.699)    (-0.988)    (-0.931)    (-0.751)    (-0.973)    (-1.286)    
Host-country Institutional development * State ownership                                   -0.020**                                    -0.021**  
                                                            (-2.698)                                     (-2.816)    
Host-country institutional development * Absorptive capacity                                               1.060***                         1.181*** 
                                                                       (5.414)                          (6.137)    
Host-country institutional development * Geographic diversity                                                          0.003                 0.003    
                                                                                  (0.338)               (0.369)    
Host-country institutional development * Entry mode                                                                     0.023      0.019    
                                                                                             (1.556)    (1.391)    
Industrial dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Log-Likelihood             -8463.06    -8462.55    -8467.12    -8462.01    -8434.02    -8463.92    -8465.78    -8432.18    
AIC                        16954.12    16955.10    16970.25    16962.03    16906.04    16965.83    16969.57    16908.36    
Degree of freedom               12         13         16         17         17         17         17         20    
Significance of model test    0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00    
Notes: The values reported are regression coefficients, with t-values given in parentheses; * indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.05 (** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001) level of confidence (two-tailed tests). 
 37
Fig 1. Research model  
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Fig. 2a. Host-country institutional development, state ownership, and parent innovation 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2b. Host-country institutional development, absorptive capacity, and parent innovation 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 39
 
